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Interpreting "Prior Record" under the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act
Bradley T Smitht
In the juvenile justice system, few issues are as important as
whether a minor will be tried as an adult. When a juvenile court
waives its jurisdiction and transfers a juvenile to criminal court, the
minor faces the possibility of more severe punishment, public expo-
sure, the stigma of a permanent criminal record, and incarceration
with convicted felons.
Over the last two decades, legislators at both the state and federal
level have responded to a perception of rising juvenile crime by mak-
ing it easier to transfer minors to adult status.' This change is part of a
general reassessment of how the criminal justice system handles
youthful offenders in the wake of gang violence, child murderers, and
senseless school shootings."
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I See Howard N. Snyder and Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 Na-
tional Report 88 (GPO 1999) ("During the 1980's, the public perceived that serious juvenile
crime was increasing and that the system was too lenient with offenders. Although there was
substantial misperception regarding increases in juvenile crime, many States responded by pass-
ing more punitive laws. Some laws removed certain classes of offenders from the juvenile justice
system and handled them as adult criminals in criminal court."). Between 1992 and 1997, forty-
five states passed laws making "it easier to transfer juvenile offenders from the juvenile justice
system to the criminal justice system." Id at 89. A number of states during this period "enacted
mandatory waiver or exclusion statutes," which require that minors charged with certain offenses
be automatically transferred to adult criminal court. Id at 103. See also Barry C. Feld, The Trans-
formation of the Juvenile Court-Part 11: Race and the "Crack Down" on Youth Crime, 84 Minn L
Rev 327, 357-58 (1999) (noting that the rate of juvenile transfers increased by 68 percent be-
tween 1988 and 1992 and that "It]he pace of legal changes to prosecute more juveniles as adults
escalated sharply in the early 1990s"); Michael Finley and Marc Schindler, Punitie Juvenile Jus-
tice Policies and the Impact on Minority Youth, 63 Fed Prob 11, 11 (1999) (noting that although
juvenile crime declined in the last years of the 1990s, over forty states passed laws "to allow in-
creased prosecution of juveniles in adult criminal courts"); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Juvenile Jus-
tice, 9 Crim Just 45,47 (1994) (noting the increased likelihood that minors will be prosecuted-
either as delinquents or as adults after transfer-in federal courts under the Federal Juvenile De-
linquency Act). Ironically, at the same time legislation has been making it more likely that mi-
nors will be tried as adults, the number of serious violent crimes committed by juveniles has
dramatically declined. See Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 62 (noting a decline by 33
percent in the number of serious crimes involving at least one juvenile offender).
2 A 1998 NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll found, for example, that "two-thirds of
Americans think juveniles under age 13 who commit murder should be tried as adults." Jeffrey
A. Butts and Adele V. Harrell, Delinquents or Criminals: Policy Options for Young Offenders 1
(Urban Institute 1998).
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This Comment deals with one aspect of this transformation in ju-
venile law. It examines a recent conflict among federal circuit courts
concerning what constitutes a "prior delinquency record," which is one
of six factors that courts must consider when deciding whether to
transfer a minor to adult status under the Federal Juvenile Delin-
quency Act ("FJDA").' Some circuits have held that a juvenile's prior
delinquency record only includes prior adjudicated behavior. Many of
these same courts, however, have read other factors expansively and
permitted uncharged and unadjudicated conduct that is excluded from
the prior record factor to be examined under one of the FJDA's five
remaining factors. Alternatively, one circuit has interpreted prior re-
cord expansively to include not only prior adjudications, but prior ar-
rests as well. Ultimately, this Comment suggests that courts should in-
terpret the FJDA to permit the review of both adjudicated and unad-
judicated prior arrests as part of the juvenile's prior record, but should
exclude from consideration previously uncharged conduct that did not
result in an arrest.
Part I of this Comment briefly considers the evolution of the
modern juvenile court. Part II then describes the Supreme Court
precedent that altered the once informal practices of juvenile courts.
Part III discusses the FJDA, and Part IV details the circuit conflict
over the meaning of a prior delinquency record. Part V then relies on
the text and purpose of the FJDA to suggest that when a court exam-
ines a juvenile's prior delinquency record, it should consider prior ar-
rests, but not uncharged criminal conduct.
I. THE RISE OFTHE JUVENILE COURT
Although this Comment specifically considers the FJDA,4 it is
helpful to understand the backdrop against which Congress drafted
that legislation. This, in turn, requires considering what the founders of




The idea that courts should treat juvenile offenders differently
from adult criminals took hold during the Progressive movement a
century ago. With the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the
3 18 USC §§ 5031 et seq (1994).
4 Id.
5 For a general discussion of the rise of juvenile courts, see Barry C Feld, The Transforma-
tion of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn L Rev 691 (1991); Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The
Invention of Delinquency (Chicago 2d ed 1977); Robert M. Mennel, Thorns & Thistles: Juvenile
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United States came a restructuring of the American family. No longer
was the workplace synonymous with the family farm or a person's
home."
As a result of these shifts, the concept of the family changed. The
number of children in families declined, and a "more modem con-
cept[ ] of childhood emerged."8 Children, many Progressives argued,
did not simply blossom into adults with a minimal amount of adult in-
tervention. Instead, "[c]hildren were perceived as corruptible inno-
cents whose upbringing required ... physical, social, and moral struc-
ture."" Parents, particularly women, were to take on a greater role in
the supervision and upbringing of children. As an outgrowth of this
theory, Progressives suggested that criminal acts by children were not
signs of an inherently flawed character; rather, they argued that socie-
tal forces and a lack of moral direction were largely responsible for
wrongdoing."'
Therefore, Progressive reformers asserted that special courts
should be established with judges that were cognizant of the malleable
nature of children and empowered to intervene and prevent a child
from being corrupted, abused, or neglected." This idea drew support
from the doctrine of parens patriae, a British theory which held "that it
is the state's responsibility to care for the vulnerable, including juve-
niles and all others who are unable to care for themselves."'2 The state,
the Progressives asserted, "had the inherent power and responsibility
to provide protection for children whose natural parents were not
providing appropriate care or supervision."'3 The goal of juvenile
Delinquents in the United States, 1825-1940 (New England 1973) (all outlining the Progressives'
role in pushing for a separate juvenile justice system).
6 See Feld, 84 Minn L Rev at 332 (cited in note 1) (noting a "shift of economic functions
from the family to other work environments").
7 See Barry C Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative
Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J Crim L & Criminol 471,473 (1987) (noting how a "a
shift of economic functions from the family to other work environments modified the role of
women and children").
8 Id at 474.
9 Id.
10 Id at 475 (noting how the Progressives' approach of attributing "criminal behavior to ex-
ternal antecedent forces rather than to deliberately chosen misconduct reduced an actor's moral
responsibility for crime and focused on the reform of the offender rather than the punishment of
the offense").
11 See Platt, The Child Savers at 10 (cited in note 5) ("The juvenile court system was part
of a general movement directed toward removing adolescents from the criminal law process and
creating special programs for delinquent, dependent, and neglected children.").
12 Sarah Freitas, Comment, Extending the Privilege against Self-Incrimination to the Juve-
nile Waiver Hearing, 62 U Chi L Rev 301,303 (1995). See also Anne Rankin Mahoney, Juvenile
Justice in Context 21 (Northeastern 1987) ("Known as parenspatriae ('parent of the nation'), this
doctrine was adapted ... to authorize the juvenile court judges to intervene in the lives of chil-
dren as they saw fit.").
13 Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 86 (cited in note 1).
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courts, then, was to ensure that minors who did not receive proper
guidance would "be protected, nurtured, and treated, rather than held
completely responsible and punished for their wrongdoing.
' 14
Under such a broad mandate, juvenile courts could intervene at
the first sign of potential trouble from a youth, regardless of whether
such activity normally would be considered "criminal."'5 The specific
details of the crime mattered only to the extent that they might shed
light on the type of individual before the court and the prospects for
his or her rehabilitation. 
6
2. Limited procedural protections in the juvenile courts.
With such a free-wielding scope of inquiry, a juvenile court pro-
ceeding was "'anti-legal' in the sense that it encouraged minimum
procedural formality and maximum dependency on extra-legal re-
sources."'7 Because proceedings in juvenile court were considered civil
rather than criminal matters, ordinary criminal procedures and due
process protections did not apply.8 Many states, for instance, simply
required a prosecutor to prove his case against a minor by a prepon-
derance of the evidence; statutes did not require courts to provide
"defense attorneys, appeals, or even formal procedures."'9 Juries were
not used. The judge, any attorneys involved, and the minor "conversed
freely about the appropriate resolution" in what was akin to an infor-
mal dialogue. 2 At the same time, this informality ensured that minors
would avoid the "stigma of a criminal record," as juvenile hearings
were sealed from the press and public.
2
'
14 Martin L. Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist, Cracking Down on Juveniles: The Changing
Ideology of Youth Corrections, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub Pol 323,324 (1991). See also
Barry C. Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 Minn
L Rev 141,146-47 (1984) ("[Progressives] focused ... on reforming the offender rather than on
punishing the offense. The result was ... open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies so
that the criminal justice professional had the discretion to formulate individualized, case-by-case
strategies for rehabilitating the deviant.").
15 See Platt, The Child Savers at 142 (cited in note 5) (noting that juvenile courts could in-
tervene "where no offense had actually been committed but where, for example, a child was pos-
ing problems for some person in authority, such as a parent or teacher or social worker").
16 Feld, 78 J Crim L & Criminol at 477 (cited in note 7). See also Platt, The Child Savers at
141 (cited in note 5) ("The [juvenile court] judges were authorized to investigate the character
and social background of both 'pre-delinquent' and 'delinquent' children. They examined per-
sonal motivation as well as criminal intent, seeking to identify the moral reputation of problem-
atic children.").
17 Platt, The Child Savers at 141 (cited in note 5).
18 See Snyder and Sickmund,Juvenile Offenders at 87 (cited in note 1) ("In this benevolent
court ... due process protections afforded criminal defendants were deemed unnecessary.").
19 Butts and Harrell, Delinquents or Criminals at 3 (cited in note 2).
20 Freitas, Comment, 62 U Chi L Rev at 304 (cited in note 12).
21 Platt, The Child Savers at 137 (cited in note 5).
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The informal and discretionary nature of juvenile proceedings
was especially apparent when a court disposed of a juvenile case.
Since reformers perceived juvenile court judges as benevolent guardi-
ans," the courts "enjoyed enormous discretion to make dispositions in
the 'best interests of the child.' ' ' 4 Concerns about the unlimited nature
of such discretion did not worry juvenile court proponents. As one
scholar noted, "Early reformers of juvenile court were not unduly
concerned about the 'lawless dimension' of discretion. Caught up in
the optimism of the era and convinced of the strength of professional-
ism, they trusted that judges would use it wisely.'"" Consequently, be-
yond acting in "the best interests of the child," few guidelines existed
for determining the appropriate treatment for a youth." The net result
of such a framework was that juvenile court dispositions varied tre-
mendously from one case to another.2
This discretion extended to the exclusion of the offender from the
juvenile justice system altogether. If a juvenile judge determined a
"youth was not amenable to ... rehabilitative treatment," the court
could waive jurisdiction over the juvenile, at which point the minor
would enter the criminal justice system and be tried as an adult.2 As
with other juvenile court proceedings, such determinations were
largely discretionary.! One study, for example, noted: "Transfer deci-
sions were made on a case-by-case basis using a 'best interests of the
child and public' standard, and were thus within the realm of indi-
vidualized justice.""1 Typically, however, courts waived into adult
22 Since juvenile proceedings are civil and not criminal, a minor is not technically "sen-
tenced" in juvenile court. Rather, the youth's status is adjudicated. If a minor is found to have
committed an illegal act, he is "adjudicated" a delinquent and instead of being sentenced re-
ceives a disposition plan. See Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 97-100 (cited in note
1) (outlining the general nature of a juvenile proceeding and distinguishing it from criminal pro-
ceedings).
23 See Platt, The Child Savers at 142 (cited in note 5) (noting that the "model" juvenile
court judge was seen as a sort of "doctor-counselor rather than [a] lawyer").
24 Feld, 78 J Crim & Criminol at 477 (cited in note 7).
25 Mahoney, Juvenile Justice in Context at 23 (cited in note 12).
26 See Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 87 (cited in note 1).
27 See Feld, 78 J Crim & Criminol at 477 (cited in note 7) ("As reflected in juvenile sen-
tencing practices, an extremely wide frame of relevance and an absence of controlling rules or
norms characterized this type of decision-making.").
28 Feld, 75 Minn L Rev at 695 (cited in note 5) ("Because a youth's offense was only a
symptom of her 'real' needs, sentences were indeterminate, nonproportional, and potentially
continued for the duration of minority.").
29 Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case forAbolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 NC L Rev 1083,1109-11 (1991).
30 See Feld, 78 J Crim & Criminol at 478 (cited in note 7) ("From its inception, juvenile
court judges also had the discretion to waive serious young offenders from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court to adult criminal courts.").
31 Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 86 (cited in note 1).
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criminal court older boys arrested for committing more serious
crimes.?
B. The Federal Response
1. The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938.
By 1925, nearly two-thirds of the states had adopted, in one form
or another, a separate juvenile justice system. In the late 1930s, the
federal government followed the states' lead and enacted the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act,.3 which would remain "virtually un-
changed" for the next thirty-six years. The Act, like its state counter-
parts, provided that a juvenile-defined as anyone under the age of
eighteen 3-charged with violating federal law would be processed as a
delinquent rather than tried as an adult criminal. A juvenile found
delinquent would either be placed on probation "for a period not ex-
ceeding his minority" or committed to the "custody of the Attorney
General," who could subsequently place the youth in "any public or
private agency or foster home for ... custody, care, subsistence, educa-
tion, and training."37 Similar to the state acts, the FJDA did not provide
for jury trials.38
Unlike in many states, however, the decision to waive juvenile ju-
risdiction and try a minor as an adult rested entirely with the Attorney
General, rather than the courts." While some states permitted a prose-
cutor to waive a juvenile into adult court initially, "most juvenile
courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over all youth who were
charged with violating criminal laws. Only if the juvenile court waived
its jurisdiction in a case could a child be transferred to criminal adult
court and tried as an adult."
32 See David J. Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and its Alternatives in
Progressive America 285 (Harper Collins 1980) (noting that most transferred youths were older
males who were charged with violent crimes or large thefts of property).
33 18 USC §§ 5031 et seq (1959).
34 William S. Sessions and Faye M. Bracey, A Synopsis of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act, 14 St Mary's L J 509,509 (1983) (reviewing the basic rights and benefits provided to a juve-
nile charged with a criminal offense in federal court and discussing in detail the procedures out-
lined in the FJDA).
35 18 USC § 5031.
36 18 USC § 5032.
37 18 USC § 5034.
38 18 USC § 5033.
39 18 USC § 5032 (stating that a "juvenile ... shall be proceeded against as a juvenile delin-
quent if he consents to such a procedure, unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, has ex-
pressly authorized otherwise"). See also Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Re-
thinking Federal Intervention in Juvenile Justice, 51 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L 331, 338
(1997) (discussing how the 1938 Act granted the Attorney General "unlimited discretion" in de-
ciding how to prosecute a minor).
40 Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 86 (cited in note 1).
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2. Deferral to states.
Although the FIDA signaled the federal government's first foray
into juvenile justice law, the Act's impact has been relatively minor. In
part, this is because the Act has a strong presumption against federal
courts handling juvenile cases. Under the FJDA, for example, the fed-
eral government may only assert jurisdiction over a juvenile when one
of three criteria are met: (1) the state juvenile court lacks or refuses to
take jurisdiction over a minor; (2) the state lacks appropriate facilities
to handle the juvenile; or (3) the offense is a violent felony or narcot-
ics related crime.4' In addition, the Attorney General must certify "that
there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense" for
the matter to proceed.42
As a result of this presumption in favor of state courts, most
prosecutions of juveniles remain at the state level.4' In 1995, for in-
stance, only 122 juveniles faced delinquency proceedings at the federal
level." By contrast, in 1994, there were over 1.5 million juvenile delin-
quency cases pending in state juvenile courts.'
Despite the small role of the federal government in juvenile
cases, the FJDA may become more important as the federal govern-
ment federalizes more and more crimes." In 1994, for example, por-
tions of the "federal omnibus crime bill encourage[d] or even re-
quire[d] federal handling of juveniles when they are charged with gun-
or gang-related crimes."4 7 Such changes, one commentator explained,
are "likely [to] result in more juvenile cases being adjudicated in the
federal system."'
41 18 USC § 5032.
42 Id.
43 See Yeckel, Note, 51 Wash U J Urban & Contemp L at 338 (cited in note 39) (noting
how the "overwhelming majority ... of juvenile offenders are tried in state courts"); Shepherd, 9
Crim Just at 45 (cited in note 1) (noting a "strong presumption" under current law against trying
juveniles in federal court). In part, this may stem from the fact that states, unlike the federal gov-
ernment, have facilities especially designed for minors. The federal government closed its last ju-
venile correction center in the 1980s. Shepherd, 9 Crim Just at 46. Similarly, the federal govern-
ment does not have a separate court system devoted exclusively to the handling of juveniles;
federal district courts handle proceedings against minors. See 18 USC § 5033.
44 See John Scalia,Juvenile Delinquents in the Federal Criminal Justice System 3 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics 1997).
45 Id.
46 See Shepherd, 9 Crim Just at 47 (cited in note 1) ("Prosecutions of juveniles in federal
courts pursuant to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, either as delinquents or as adults after
transfer, are likely to increase markedly in the years to come.").
47 Id at 45.
48 Id. For a discussion of the general rise in federal crimes, see Charles D. Bonner, Com-
ment, The Federalization of Crime: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 32 U Rich L Rev 905, 920
(1998) (noting that "between 1980 and 1993, the number of filings of criminal cases [in federal
courts] increased by 70 [percent]").
2000] 1437
The University of Chicago Law Review
II. EXTENSION OF DUE PROCESS INTO JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
A. Discontent over the Exercise of Discretion
During the 1960s, many commentators began to question the un-
bridled procedural discretion juvenile courts enjoyed. Some critics
were motivated by doubts about just how different the sentences
handed down by juvenile courts were from those received in criminal
courts. As one observer noted, "A concern for procedural protections
in juvenile court decision processes grew in part as it became more
apparent that in practice the functions of the juvenile justice system
closely resembled those of the criminal justice system-punishment,
deterrence, and incapacitation of persons who violated the criminal
law.'
Additionally, and perhaps reflecting the tenor of the times, many
charged that limitless discretion "provided a cloak for discrimination
rather than individualized justice."'" Two researchers, for instance, con-
cluded that being a black male from a lower socio-economic back-
ground was more determinative of the manner in which a juvenile
court disposed of a case than "the type of past offenses" committed by
a minor." Studies also revealed large discrepancies "in the duration
and type of intervention or treatment ordered by juvenile authori-
ties." 5 The intentional secrecy of the proceedings only furthered
charges of arbitrariness and preferential adjudication. 3
In response to these criticisms, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson
appointed commissions to investigate the handling of juvenile cases at
both the state and federal level. A 1967 report by President Johnson's
commission declared that the Progressive reforms ushered in sixty
years earlier had failed to fulfill their promise.4 According to the re-
port, juvenile courts did not "decrease[ ] recidivism" and many juve-
nile facilities were "corrupt[ed] rather than reform[ed]. ''a
Indeed, the commission's report indicted the Progressive's entire
approach. According to the commission, "[e]xperience[ ] over [the
49 Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub Pol at 328 (cited in note 14). See
also Mahoney, Juvenile Justice in Context at 24 (cited in note 12) (noting that in the 1960s many
critics felt the punishment inflicted on juveniles was "as severe as that meted out to adults, and
that children, like adults, should not have their liberty taken away without due process of law").
50 Mahoney, Juvenile Justice in Context at 24 (cited in note 12).
51 Frank R. Scarpitti and Richard M. Stephenson, Juvenile Court Dispositions: Factors in
the Decision-making Process, 17 Crim & Delinquency 142,150 (1971).
52 Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub Pol at 328 (cited in note 14).
53 See Mahoney, Juvenile Justice in Context at 24-25 (cited in note 12) (noting concerns
about the impartiality of a system that released an arrested youth "back into the community al-
most before the arresting officer returned to work while others remained in custody").
54 A Report by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 84-85 (GPO 1967).
55 Mahoney, Juvenile Justice in Context at 25 (cited in note 12).
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last] half a century with juvenile courts has taught us that these aspira-
tions were greatly over-optimistic and chimerical. The court's wide-
ranging jurisdiction thus has often become an anachronism serving to
facilitate gratuitous coercive intrusions into the lives of children and
families."'" At the most basic level, one commentator claimed that the
report suggested the "early belief that troubled and troublesome ju-
veniles could be successfully handled in a system based on ... maxi-
mum discretion ... failed to yield [satisfactory] results." To correct
this problem, the commission urged the narrowing of the jurisdiction
of juvenile courts and also called for the proceduralization of the ju-
venile process."
B. Kent and its Progeny
With its 1966 decision in Kent v United States," the Supreme
Court weighed in on the debate over the appropriateness of "infor-
mal" juvenile proceedings and, effectively, "began a procedural revo-
lution" in juvenile justice.6' In Kent, a juvenile court acting pursuant to
a provision of the Washington, D.C. Code transferred a minor to a
federal district court for trial as an adult without holding a hearing or
"recit[ing] any reason for the waiver."' Kent was subsequently found
guilty and sentenced to "a total of 30 to 90 years in prison."62
In light of these facts, the Supreme Court reversed Kent's convic-
tion. Although recognizing that the "Juvenile Court ... [had] consider-
able latitude within which to determine whether it should retain juris-
diction over a child," the Court found such discretion "[did] not confer
upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure."' 3 Sweeping
aside the Progressives' arguments that informality was necessary to
adequately address the individual needs of juveniles, the Court de-
clared that when transferring a minor to adult status "there is no place
in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous conse-
quences without ceremony-without hearing, without effective assis-
tance of counsel, without a statement of reasons." Thus, the Court
held that any minor facing a waiver was entitled to a hearing, access to
court records, and a statement of the grounds for such a transfer."
56 The Challenge of Crime at 84-85 (cited in note 54).
57 Mahoney, Juvenile Justice in Context at 30 (cited in note 12).
58 The Challenge of Crime at 85 (cited in note 54).
59 383 US 541 (1966).
60 Forst and Blomquist, 5 Notre Dame J L, Ethics, & Pub Pol at 330 (cited in note 14).
61 383 US at 546.
62 Id at 550.
63 Id at 552-53.
64 Id at 554.
65 Id at 557.
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One year later, the Supreme Court extended Kent's due process
protection by ruling in In re Gault that during a juvenile delinquency
hearing, a juvenile must be given sufficient notice of the proceedings.6'
In cases that could "result in commitment to an institution in which
the juvenile's freedom is curtailed," the Court held juveniles had a
right to be represented by an attorney and could have counsel ap-
pointed if he or his parents could not afford a lawyer.' The Court also
extended the right against self-incrimination to juvenile proceedings,
even if they were technically civil dispositions.6 Moreover, a minor
could no longer be declared a delinquent on hearsay evidence alone;
the Court ruled instead that valid, sworn testimony which could be
challenged through cross-examination had to be presented in delin-
quency proceedings.0
Following Gault, the Supreme Court continued to impose crimi-
nal procedure safeguards on civil juvenile proceedings. In In re Win-
ship,7' the Court held that in order for a juvenile to be found delin-
quent, the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.72 Echoing this theme, the Court ruled in Breed v Jones" that the
distinctions between delinquency and criminal proceedings were not
enough to deny juveniles the Fifth Amendment's protection against
double jeopardy. Consequently, a juvenile could not be tried in a
criminal setting for conduct previously adjudicated at a delinquency
hearing.24
The net result of Kent, Gault, Winship, and Breed was to turn the
Progressive formula on its head. As Barry Feld, one of the leading au-
thorities on the juvenile justice system, explained: "By emphasizing
criminal procedural regularity in the determination of delinquency,
the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the juvenile court from the
Progressive emphasis on the 'real needs' of the child to proof of the
commission of criminal acts, thereby effectively transforming juvenile
proceedings into criminal prosecutions. 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court
went out of its way to discount the Progressive ideal. In Gault, for in-
stance, the Court emphatically rejected the large amount of discretion
66 387 US 1 (1967).
67 Id at 33.
68 Id at 41.
69 Id at 55.
70 Id at 56-57.
71 397 US 358 (1970).
72 Id at 368. In the process, the Supreme Court noted "civil labels and good intentions do
not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts." Id at
365-66.
73 421 US 519 (1975).
74 Id at 541.
75 Feld, 69 Minn L Rev at 161 (cited in note 14).
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associated with juvenile proceedings, warning at one point that "the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."76
Yet it would be a mistake to suggest the Supreme Court rejected
the Progressives' larger goal of keeping minors out of the adult court
system. By strengthening procedures in the juvenile process and re-
stricting the ability of a court simply to transfer a juvenile at will to
criminal court, the Court implicitly endorsed the idea of treating juve-
niles differently in the criminal justice system." In Gault, for instance,
the Court, perhaps anticipating the charge of critics that the decision
would mean the end of juvenile courts, declared "the commendable
principles relating to processing and treatment of juveniles separately
from adults are in no way involved or affected by the procedural is-
sues under discussion.' ' 8
III. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AcT
In the wake of Kent and its progeny, and the executive reports at-
tacking procedural informalities in juvenile courts, the U.S. Congress
amended the Federal Juvenile Delinquency ActO in order to "provide
basic procedural rights for juveniles who come under Federal jurisdic-
tion and to bring Federal procedures up to the standards set by vari-
ous model acts, many state codes and court decisions."' In keeping
with the Kent and Gault decisions, the amendments require that any
transfer decision be made on the record, and provide for both the
right to a speedy adjudication and the right to counsel.
But the revised Act also goes a step beyond Kent, by altering the
criteria for transferring juveniles within the federal court system. It
removes the previously unfettered discretion of the Attorney General
to transfer a juvenile to adult status and places the responsibility in
the hands of federal district courts.2 Additionally, the amended Act
limits the discretion of district courts to authorize such transfers in the
first place. First, it provides that only those juveniles who, after turning
fifteen, are charged with committing a crime of violence that would be
a felony if committed by an adult, or who are accused of violating cer-
tain narcotic laws, may be transferred.n Secondly, the Act requires a
76 Gault, 387 US at 28.
77 See Kent, 383 US at 556-57 (stressing the seriousness of transferring a minor to adult
status).
78 387 US at 22.
79 18 USC §§ 5031 et seq.
80 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, S Rep No 93-1011, 93d Gong,
2d Sess 19 (1974).
81 18 USC § 5032.
82 Id (stating that a juvenile may only be transferred to adult status upon the motion of the
Attorney General and after a court holds a hearing to consider the transfer motion).
83 Id.
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court to determine, after a hearing, that removing the minor from the
juvenile justice system "would be in the interest of justice."'
When considering what would be in the interest of justice, Sec-
tion 5032 of the statute specifies six factors that courts must consider
when deciding whether to waive jurisdiction.S These factors are:
[1] the age and social background of the juvenile; [2] the nature
of the alleged offense; [3] the extent and nature of the juvenile's
prior delinquency record; [4] the juvenile's present intellectual
development and psychological maturity; [5] the nature of past
treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; and
[6] the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's
behavioral problems.
The government bears the burden of presenting evidence on all six
factors. If it fails to address even one of the six elements, the juvenile
may not be transferred to adult status.8
Courts have held that under the amended FJDA, unlike its Pro-
gressive Era counterpart, a juvenile has the right to an immediate, in-
terlocutory appeal of any transfer order." In large measure, this im-
mediate appeal reflects courts' awareness that a transfer carries severe
consequences As a number of circuits have pointed out, the purpose
of the revised FJDA "is to remove juveniles from the ordinary crimi-
nal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction
and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation."' Courts seem to rec-
84 Id.
85 Id. See also United States v Nelson, 68 F3d 583,588 (2d Cir 1995) (noting that a "district
court is constrained to consider six factors and to make findings in the record regarding each of
them").
86 18 USC § 5032.
87 See United States v Anthony Y., 172 F3d 1249,1252 (10th Cir 1999) (noting that "the gov-
ernment must present evidence on each factor"), cert denied 120 S Ct 228 (1999); United States v
Leon, D.M., 132 F3d 583, 589 (10th Cir 1997) (same). District courts do not have complete dis-
cretion in every transfer decision, however. Following the example of the state legislatures, Con-
gress has amended the FJDA so that in certain cases a court must automatically waive the juve-
nile into criminal court. Under the Act, for example, if a juvenile is over sixteen, was previously
found to have committed a felony offense, and is currently charged with a violent offense or cer-
tain narcotics offenses, the juvenile is automatically transferred to adult status. See 18 USC §
5032.
88 Leon, D.M., 132 F3d at 587 (citing numerous cases and noting that every circuit that has
addressed the question has "concluded that an order transferring a juvenile to adult status is
immediately appealable"); United States v Bilbo, 19 F3d 912,914 (5th Cir 1994) (same).
89 See Leon, D.M., 132 F3d at 588 (noting that "a juvenile would lose the legal and practi-
cal benefits afforded by the Act if he or she were forced to wait until after a final judgment to
appeal an order of transfer to adult status"). See also United States v Gerald N., 900 F2d 189, 190
(9th Cir 1990) ("[W]e conclude-as have our fellow courts of appeals that have considered the
issue-that the legal and practical value of the right to be tried as a juvenile would be destroyed
without the concomitant right of immediate appeal.").
90 United States v Brian N, 900 F2d 218,220 (10th Cir 1990). See S Rep No 93-1011 at 22
(cited in note 80) (declaring that the Act's goal is "to assist youth in becoming productive mem-
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ognize that by removing the minor from the juvenile justice process,
the juvenile faces publicity, the possibility of incarceration amongst
adults, stiffer penalties, and a felony record." As one commentator ob-
served, "criminal court transfer offers a drastic and permanent solu-
tion for an offender thought to be beyond redemption. It is the court's
way of saying, 'there are no more second chances for you."'' Conse-
quently, a transfer is properly granted only when a court, after consid-
ering the six statutory factors, "determines that the risk of harm to so-
ciety posed by affording the defendant more lenient treatment within
the juvenile justice system outweighs the defendant's chance for reha-
bilitation."9 3
Despite these statutory guidelines, courts continue to enjoy con-
siderable latitude in deciding whether a transfer should go forward. As
a number of circuits have noted, "the district court need not find that
each factor weighs in favor of transfer in order to grant the govern-
ment's motion."4 Nor are courts required to give each factor equal
weight in reaching a transfer decision.9 5 In fact, a district court need
not decide whether a particular factor weighs in favor or against trans-
ferring the minor.% Essentially, "the district court must balance the
bers of our society ... by... channelling] juveniles, for whom the criminal justice system is inap-
propriate, away from and out of the system into human problem-solving agencies and profes-
sions").
91 See Gerald N., 900 F2d at 190. See also Shepherd, 9 Crim Just at 47 (cited in note 1)
(noting "[a] juvenile's conviction as an adult subsequent to certification and transfer carries with
it all the consequences that would befall an adult. In fact, 'youth' is not even a specific factor for
a downward adjustment in a federal sentence under the guidelines.").
92 Butts and Harrell, Delinquents or Criminals at 7 (cited in note 2). See also Thomas F.
Geraghty and Will Rhee, Learning from Tragedy: Representing Children in Discretionary Transfer
Hearings, 33 Wake Forest L Rev 595,599 (1998) ("Every transfer is a tragedy. It is a tragedy for
the children-many of whom have already experienced too much tragedy in their young lives
and now must face the harsher penalties of the criminal court.").
93 United States v One Juvenile Male, 40 F3d 841,844 (6th Cir 1994).
94 Anthony Y, 172 F3d at 1252.
95 See United States v Juvenile Male #1, 47 F3d 68,71 (2d Cir 1995) (noting that a district
court "is not required to afford equal weight to each factor, but instead may balance them as it
deems appropriate"). See also United States v Wilson, 149 F3d 610,614 (7th Cir 1998) (holding
that district courts have the "discretion to give more weight to some factors than to others");
United States v Juvenile JG, 139 F3d 584,586-87 (8th Cir 1998) (concluding that the trial court
may use its discretion in assigning different weights to each factor); United States v Wellington,
102 F3d 499,506 (11th Cir 1996) (noting that a district court, after considering each of the six fac-
tors, may weigh them "as it deems appropriate"); United States v A.R., 38 F3d 699,705 (3d Cir
1994) (noting a court may "give more weight to [one] factor than to others"); United States v
Doe, 871 F2d 1248,1254-55 (5th Cir 1989) ("A court is certainly not required to weigh all statu-
tory factors equally.").
96 Anthony Y, 172 F3d at 1252, quoting Juvenile Male #1, 47 F3d at 71 ("[A district court] is
not required to state whether each specific factor favors or disfavors transfer"). See also Welling-
ton, 102 F3d at 505 ("Section 5032 simply requires a finding on the record as to each factor, but
does not require that ... each factor [be] weighed for or against the transfer."); United States v
Three Male Juveniles, 49 F3d 1058,1061 (5th Cir 1995) (concluding that a district court need not
state whether a factor weighs for or against transfer).
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evidence before it, weighing each factor as it sees fit."" As a result of
this deference, appellate courts review the transfer decision only for
an "abuse of discretion" or a "clearly erroneous" conclusion.i
IV. CONFLICrS OVER THE DEFINITION OF PRIOR JUVENILE
DELiNQUENCY RECORD
Because of the limited but still discretionary power to transfer
minors under the FJDA, the definition of each statutory factor is im-
portant. Since district courts can give one factor (for example, the na-
ture of the alleged offense) more weight than another (for example,
social background), a juvenile could conceivably be transferred mainly
due to one statutory element.' This concern becomes even greater
when it is noted that "[iun many, if not most, juvenile cases handled in
district court pursuant to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, certi-
fication is followed by a motion for transfer to adult criminal status
and trial as an adult."19
Within the last decade, this concern has manifested itself in courts
disagreeing over the interpretation of one of the six factors: prior ju-
venile delinquency record. One circuit has suggested that only prior,
adjudicated conduct may be considered under this factor.'' Others
have held that although certain unadjudicated and uncharged conduct
may not be considered under the prior record factor, it may be evalu-
ated under a more elastic factor, such as social background.'9 Still an-
other circuit has read the term as including prior, unadjudicated ar-
rests.99
97 Anthony Y, 172 F3d at 1252.
98 See Nelson, 68 F3d at 588 ("The decision of the district court [to transfer] is a discretion-
ary one and will not be disturbed except upon our finding of an abuse of discretion. A district
court is said to have abused its discretion when it fails to make the required factual findings or
where the findings it does make are clearly erroneous.") (citation omitted); United States v Alex-
ander, 695 F2d 398, 400 (9th Cir 1982) ("[Tlhe decision to transfer a juvenile to adult status is
within the sound discretion of the district judge.").
99 See, for example, Un'ited States v Wilson, 149 F3d 610, 613 (7th Cir 1998) (upholding
transfer where only one factor weighed in favor).
100 Shepherd, 9 Crim Just at 46 (cited in note 1). But see Scalia, Juvenile Delinquents at 2
(cited in note 44) ("While the Department of Justice does not systematically collect information
describing Federal juvenile transfers, it estimates that during the 12 months ending September
30, 1994, 65 persons accused of delinquency were referred to the Attorney General for transfer
to adult status.").
101 See In re Sealed Case, 893 F2d 363,369 n 12 (DC Cir 1990) (arguing "Congress could not
have contemplated the hearing to focus on a plethora of uncharged and unproven offenses").
102 See, for example, United States v Juvenile LWO, 160 F3d 1179,1183 (8th Cir 1998) (con-
cluding the social background and intellectual immaturity factors are broad enough to look at
"almost any action, criminal or otherwise, the juvenile has taken").
103 Wilson, 149 F3d at 613 (concluding prior record includes prior arrest).
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A. Full Exclusion of Prior Unadjudicated Conduct
In In re Sealed Case,"' the D.C. Circuit became the first circuit to
express concerns about the inclusion of unadjudicated, prior conduct
in transfer hearings. In re Sealed Case involved a juvenile who was ar-
rested and charged with three counts of cocaine distribution. The gov-
ernment moved, pursuant to Section 5032, to transfer the minor to
adult status "so that it could prosecute him criminally."' In making its
motion, the government presented evidence under the "nature of the
offense" factor that the juvenile had been involved in a larger drug
conspiracy, even though the minor had not been charged with that of-
fense."" After hearing the evidence, the district transferred the minor
to adult status. '
The D.C. Circuit, however, held such evidence was inappropriate
for consideration and reversed the transfer.' The court concluded that
considering uncharged conduct within the "nature of the alleged of-
fense" factor would violate the juvenile's due process rights.' Under
the FJDA, the court explained, a judge "is entitled to assume that the
juvenile committed the offense charged for the purpose of the transfer
hearing."' Such a presumption does not violate due process, the court
reasoned, because "the trial itself functions as a corrective for any re-
liance on inaccurate allegations made at the transfer stage.""'
However, because evidence pertaining to the other five catego-
ries may not be relevant at a subsequent trial, the D.C. Circuit held
that the trial judge may not make assumptions about the remaining
factors, and a juvenile must be able to challenge the government's po-
sition regarding those factors at the transfer hearing.11 2 If the "nature
of the alleged offense" category were extended to include uncharged
criminal offenses, the juvenile court would be able to make unchal-
lenged assumptions about certain activity that ultimately "[would] not
be corrected at trial."' 13 Thus, allowing "the transfer hearing judge to
presume those [uncharged] allegations true ... would violate a juve-




104 893 F2d 363 (DC Cir 1990).
105 Id at 365.
106 Id at 368.
107 Id at 365.
108 Id at 364.
109 Id at 369.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id, citing Kent, 383 US at 563, and noting that "a juvenile can contest evidence offered by
the government" for the other five categories.
113 In re Sealed Case, 893 F2d at 369.
114 Id.
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Up until this point, the court's argument only seemed to extend
to due process considerations and the narrow concerns over the "na-
ture of the alleged offense" factor. The definition of prior conduct did
not seem to be implicated. Yet the court proceeded to claim that the
six transfer factors were intended to limit "the kind of information
that comes before a judge at a transfer hearing..".. Based on this prin-
ciple, the court suggested that regardless of due process concerns, con-
sidering evidence of unadjudicated and uncharged conduct would be
inappropriate. "[S]ince... the purpose of the Act is rehabilitation and
not punishment," the court argued that "Congress could not have con-
templated the hearing to focus on a plethora of uncharged and un-
proven offenses....6
By implication, therefore, the D.C. Circuit's dicta suggested that
the scope of "prior record" did not include uncharged or unadjudi-
cated conduct. If such conduct could not be reviewed under either the
prior record or nature of offense factor, the court implied that it could
not be reviewed at all. The court suggested that only the nature of the
offense and prior delinquency record factors specifically allow for the
contemplation of violations of the law, while the remaining factors
(that is, social background, intellectual maturity, and past treatment ef-
forts) require "a transfer judge to make findings ... entirely unrelated
to the juvenile's alleged violations of the law."17
B. Excluded under Prior Record but Included under Another Factor
The D.C. Circuit's suggestion that a court could only analyze ac-
tual adjudications under the "prior record" prong was later endorsed
by the Eighth Circuit. Yet at the same time, that court, in contrast to In
re Sealed Case, liberally interpreted other factors so that a transferring
court could consider unadjudicated prior criminal conduct.
In United States v Juvenile LWO,"' a Native American youth,
LWO, broke into a home, stole a rifle, and twice shot one of the home-
owners who returned and discovered the break-in while LWO was still
on the property."9 LWO was subsequently arrested and charged with
"assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, first degree burglary, and use of a firearm in the commission of
a felony."' Not surprisingly, the government moved to transfer LWO
to adult status under Section 5032. '
115 Id at 368.
116 Id at 369 & n 12.
117 Id.
118 160 F3d 1179 (8th Cir 1998).
119 Id at 1180-81.
120 Id at 1180.
121 Id at 1181.
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During the subsequent transfer hearing, the government intro-
duced evidence of LWO's numerous run-ins with the tribal court sys-
tem, including an incident in which LWO allegedly "beat his girlfriend
and kicked and struck tribal police officers."'2 The court record re-
vealed that LWO was charged with "offenses of intoxication, profane
language, assault, and resisting lawful arrest" as a result of this alterca-
tion, but that "no disposition of these offenses" had occurred's be-
cause a hearing "was pending.'" 4
In addition to these charges, a government witness testified that
LWO had been "one of four people involved" in an assault on a tribal
resident.'2 Although the tribal court records indicated LWO had been
arrested for public intoxication, "no reference to any charges or of-
fenses arising out [of] the alleged assault" existed. 6 Thus, LWO forced
the court to answer two key questions. First, whether "a district court
may consider evidence of an uncharged assault in determining
whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice," and, second,
"whether a district court may consider evidence of an assault for
which there has been a charge but no conviction.
' '27
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by pointing out that "[t]he
plain language of the statute does not explicitly mention offenses for
which there has been no charge or a charge but no conviction."'g Cit-
ing In re Sealed Case, the court concluded that unadjudicated offenses
could not be considered under the "nature of the offense" category.'2'
The court then made explicit what was implicit in In re Sealed Case's
analysis. According to the court:
[J]ust as the D.C. Circuit believed that the plain language of the
term "the nature of the alleged offense" could not plausibly be in-
terpreted to encompass evidence of unalleged offenses ... we be-
lieve that the plain language of the term "the juvenile's prior de-
linquency record" cannot plausibly be interpreted to encompass.
.. evidence of conduct which has not been adjudicated or admit-
ted to be delinquent or criminal.3
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id at 1182. LWO's court record also included adjudicated offenses involving "malicious
mischieC" fighting," and "spouse abuse. Id at 1181.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id at 1182.
128 Id.
129 Id at 1183, quoting In re Sealed Case, 893 F2d at 365 ("We agree with the D.C Circuit's
reasoning and its conclusion that Section 5032 'does not authorize a judge to consider evidence
of other crimes in assessing "the nature of the alleged offense."').
130 160 F3d at 1183.
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Consequently, the court concluded, "the plain language of the term
'the juvenile's prior delinquency record' would not encompass evi-
dence of incidents or behavior, which could be of a delinquent or
criminal nature, for which there has been no charge or a charge but no
conviction."'.
However, even though the Eighth Circuit agreed with the D.C.
Circuit's narrow reading of Section 5032 when interpreting the term
"prior record," it found room under the statute to include the alleged
offenses. The court explicitly disavowed In re Sealed Case's interpreta-
tion that the Section 5032 factors relating to "age and social back-
ground ... present intellectual development and psychological matur-
ity ... [and] the nature of past treatment efforts [are] ... entirely unre-
lated to the juvenile's alleged violations of the law.""" Instead, the
court concluded, "the plain language of those terms is broad enough
to authorize the admission of evidence regarding almost any action,
criminal or otherwise."'3 3 As a result, the court reasoned that district
courts had the "sound discretion ... to admit evidence of other inci-
dents ... alleged to be criminal or delinquent" if they were somehow
relevant to the remaining four factors."M
Perhaps recognizing the potential breadth bf such an interpreta-
tion, the court admonished district courts that "[w]hen dealing with
evidence of other incidents, behavior, and resulting charges, if any,
[they] ... must consider the nature of the particular factor and pre-
cisely how the alleged incidents, behavior, charges, and surrounding
circumstances are relevant to that factor."'33
Although declining to decide whether unadjudicated and un-
charged conduct could be considered under the "prior conduct" prong
of Section 5032, the Tenth Circuit recently joined the Eighth Circuit
by holding, in United States v Anthony Y,' that even if prior arrests
could not be considered part of a juvenile's prior delinquency record,
they could be weighed under one of the four remaining transfer fac-
tors, such as social background. '3
131 Id. It should be noted that by making this ruling, the Eighth Circuit implicitly overruled
its precedent which had, without explanation, held that unadjudicated arrests could be consid-
ered under the prior record prong. See United States v Parker, 956 F2d 169, 172 (8th Cir 1992)
(noting that "although Parker had no official delinquency record, he had been arrested for bur-
glary of a church and for a weapons offense").
132 LWO, 160 F3d at 1183.
133 Id (emphasis added).
134 Id.
135 Id at 1183-84.
136 172 F3d 1249 (10th Cir 1999).
137 Id at 1253-54 (concluding that a juvenile's alleged assault on a school counselor might
be considered as evidence of the juvenile's response to past treatment efforts and that conduct
while in custody "relates to his present intellectual development"). The Tenth Circuit explicitly
noted that "[e]ven if we limited Anthony Y.'s prior delinquency to the three adjudicated offenses,
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C. Inclusion of Unadjudicated Arrests in the Definition of Prior
Conduct
Prior to the Eight Circuit's ruling in LWO, the Seventh Circuit
heard oral arguments in a case that also raised questions about the
definition of a prior delinquency record. In United States v Wilson,"8 a
sixteen-year-old minor was charged with "three counts of distributing
cocaine and one count of distributing crack.... During Wilson's trans-
fer hearing, the district court "considered ... a number of arrests that
did not result in convictions."' '1 Citing In re Sealed Case, Wilson as-
serted the government could only consider prior convictions when
looking at his "juvenile record.""
The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument. Noting the "paucity
of case law interpreting this part of the transfer statute," and without
defining what constituted a juvenile record, the court concluded:
"Congress could have limited the inquiry to the juvenile's prior con-
victions, but it did not.""2 Without offering reasons for its interpreta-
tion, the court, in contrast to LWO and In re Sealed Case, then defined
"delinquency record" as including "arrests as well as convictions....
That stated, the opinion proceeded to limit the district court's ex-
amination of the reasons behind the arrest, holding "the government
should not be allowed to hold mini-trials, attempting to prove the un-
derlying conduct in those instances where an arrest did not result in a
conviction. Such evidence is outside the juvenile's record and thus is
not within the limits contemplated by the statute."'" The court, how-
ever, did not explain what defines the limits of the statute or why an
unadjudicated arrest is within those bounds.4'
Pragmatically, the Wilson rule appears to allow a court to weigh
the fact that an arrest occurred and consider the reason for the arrest
without having to determine whether such conduct actually occurred.
Essentially, the holding suggests a court would note that "X" was ar-
rested for "Y," though ultimately not charged or convicted. The net ef-
the additional conduct considered by the district court was relevant to several of the other statu-
tory factors, like 'the age and social background of the juvenile,' 'the juvenile's present intellec-
tual development and psychological maturity,' or 'the nature of past treatment efforts and the
juvenile's response to such efforts." Id at 1253.
138 149 F3d 610 (7th Cir 1998).
139 Id at 611.





145 The court seemed especially concerned that a tremendous amount of evidence regarding
unadjudicated conduct "would greatly burden the parties ... with no discernable benefit." Id.
Yet, as with the determination that arrests are not beyond the scope of permissible considera-
tions, the court did not articulate why no discernable benefit would result.
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fect of considering such arrests seems to "strengthen[ ] the Govern-
ment's case for transfer."''
In sum, decisions from several circuits point in different direc-
tions. The D.C. Circuit has suggested that unadjudicated and un-
charged conduct may not be considered under the FJDA. In contrast,
the Eighth Circuit has indicated that while such conduct may not be
examined as part of a juvenile's prior delinquency record, it may be
considered under other statutory factors. The Tenth Circuit, declining
to consider the definition of prior delinquency record, has also al-
lowed unadjudicated and uncharged conduct to be reviewed under
other transfer factors. Meanwhile, the Seventh Circuit, addressing only
the narrower question of unadjudicated arrests, has bucked the trend
to hold that arrests are part of a juvenile's prior record. As the Sixth
Circuit recently noted, "[t]he scope of § 5032's reference to the 'juve-
nile record' is indeed unclear."' "7
V. TOWARD A SOLUTION
Given the lack of agreement among the circuits, this Part at-
tempts to identify the appropriate interpretation of "prior delinquency
record." To do so, this Part first considers whether it is appropriate to
read "prior record" as incorporating unadjudicated arrests, as the Sev-
enth Circuit has, or whether, as the Eighth Circuit has argued, such ar-
rests are outside the category. This discussion then looks at whether
the Eighth Circuit's approach of permitting behavior excluded from
the prior record factor to be reviewed under other statutory factors is
consistent with the text and goals of the statute. Ultimately, this Part
concludes that a construction of "prior record" that permits the con-
sideration of prior arrests but that prohibits the consideration of un-
charged criminal conduct is most appropriate.
146 United States v Jarrett, 133 F3d 519,537 (7th Cir 1998).Jarrett, ironically, involved a con-
victed juvenile who claimed the government's failure to introduce his prior, unadjudicated ar-
rests violated certain provisions of Section 5032 that require the government to submit a minor's
juvenile records to the court before the transfer hearing. Id. The Jarrett court held that because
the other records alluded to by Jarrett did not lead "to a conviction or punishment" they did not
have to be reviewed by the district court. Id.Jarrett and Wilson, taken together, create a puzzling
tension: unadjudicated arrests are not part of a juvenile's record for purposes of providing the
court with the record, but they are part of the juvenile's records for purposes of transferring the
juvenile to criminal court.
147 United States vA.R., 203 F3d 955,961 (6th Cir 2000).
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A. Unadjudicated Prior Arrests
1. The case against consideration.
A compelling argument can be made that a court should not con-
strue "prior delinquency record" as including prior arrests that did not
result in convictions. First, the statute is very clear in stating that the
juvenile's "prior delinquency record" shall be considered, "not prior
criminal conduct or prior illicit behavior. Unlike some state statutes
that explicitly define prior juvenile records as including prior arrests,"'
the FJDA does not overtly incorporate prior arrests into the prior re-
cord prong.'" Moreover, Section 5031 of the FJDA defines juvenile de-
linquency as being "the violation of a law of the United States com-
mitted by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would have
been a crime if committed by an adult.' '.. Thus, by inserting this defini-
tion into the "prior delinquency record" language, one could claim
that only actual violations of the law may be considered. Conse-
quently, without an actual adjudication or conviction, it is inappropri-
ate, one could claim, to assume an arrest reflects a "prior law viola-
tion."
2. The FJDA supports including prior arrests.
Admittedly, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Wilson for includ-
ing "prior arrests" as part of one's prior record is underdeveloped.n In
the end, however, the Seventh Circuit's inclusion of prior arrests
within the prior delinquency record factor seems appropriate.
Although the FJDA does not expressly define the meaning of a
prior delinquency record, it does not follow that prior arrest records
are excluded from consideration. Other courts have noted, for exam-
ple, that "[i]n general, when ... [courts] speak of a witness's or defen-
dant's 'record,' [they] refer to a set of facts about that person, consist-
ing of each previous arrest, whether the arrest led to conviction, and if
so, the sentence imposed and served. Those facts are usually tran-
scribed into a single document, which is also called the defendant's
'record' (or sometimes, 'rap sheet')."'5 Nothing in the FJDA suggests
148 18 USC § 5032.
149 See, for example, Mich Ct Rules, § 5.950 (West 1999) (defining prior delinquency record
for purposes of transfer as "including, but not limited to, any record of detention, any police re-
cord, any school record, or any other evidence indicating prior delinquent behavior").
150 18 USC § 5032.
151 18 USC § 5031.
152 See text accompanying notes 143-45.
153 Camitsch v Risley, 705 F2d 351,353 (9th Cir 1983). See also Aguillard v McGowen, 2000
US App LEXIS 3884, *10 (5th Cir) (describing defendant's criminal record as including "arrests
for driving while intoxicated, driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest, public drunken-
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that when drafting the 1974 amendments Congress intended to depart
from this general definition of prior record. And, indeed, a number of
district courts seem almost reflexively to consider prior, unadjudicated
arrests as being a part of a juvenile's prior delinquency record." Some
state statutes that do not explicitly include arrests in their definition of
prior records have also been construed as including prior arrests.' In
light of the FDJA's silence on the proper definition of record, it seems
appropriate to define the term as corresponding with these general
rules."
ness, and a conviction for assault and battery"); United States v Merrival, 176 F3d 1079,1081 (8th
Cir 1999) (noting that during a sentencing hearing a defendant's prior criminal record includes
tribal arrests); United States v Neff, 1998 US App LEXIS 12483, *4 (2d Cir) (describing a prior
criminal record as including both convictions and "other arrests"); United States v McClinton, 982
F2d 278, 283 (8th Cir 1992) (noting that defendant's criminal record included "five additional
prior arrests that did not result in prosecution"); Osaghe v INS, 942 F2d 1160,1163 (7th Cir 1991)
(describing arrests as part of a criminal record); United States v Sanchez, 30 F Supp 2d 595, 596
(E D NY 1998) (describing how a police check on a license plate revealed a criminal record that
"includ[ed] arrests for drug related offenses"); Fullard v City of Philadelphia, 1996 US Dist
LEXIS 5321, *3-4 (E D Pa) (describing a prior record as including "prior arrests for robbery,
burglary, theft, receiving stolen property, unauthorized use of an automobile, making terroristic
threats, simple assault, and drug-related offenses"); United States v Minor, 1991 US Dist LEXIS
15528, *3 (D DC) (describing a defendant's prior record as including "one conviction for posses-
sion of marijuana, one conviction relating to possession of a firearm, and nine prior arrests, four
of which were for drug offenses"). For an example of what Camitsch calls a rap sheet containing
both arrests and convictions, see United States v Denson, 668 F Supp 1531, 1535-39 (S D Fla
1987) (attaching a rap sheet to opinion). But compare Randie P. Ullman, Note, Federal Juvenile
Waiver Practices: A Contextual Approach to the Consideration of Prior Delinquency Records, 68
Fordham L Rev 1329,1355 (2000) ("In general criminal law vernacular, 'criminal records' refer
to prior offenses that resulted in convictions.").
154 See, for example, United States v John Doe #1, 1999 US Dist LEXIS 12992, *14 (S D NY)
(noting how the Second Circuit "has given its implicit support to the notion that a juvenile's pre-
vious arrests may be relevant to the 'prior juvenile record' factor"); United States v One Juvenile
Male, 51 F Supp 2d 1094,1098 (D Or 1999) (discussing numerous juvenile arrests that did not re-
sult in charges or in which charges were later dismissed); United States v Dion L., 19 F Supp 2d
1224, 1226 (D NM 1998) (considering prior arrests for vandalism and marijuana possession
though ultimately concluding they were too minor to favor transfer); United States v M.H., 901 F
Supp 1211,1215 (E D Tex 1995) (including prior arrests under prior record).
155 See, for instance, State v Janelle L.I., 1999 Wisc App LEXIS 740, *4 (noting that juve-
nile's prior record included "sixty police contacts").
156 Such an interpretation is also in accordance with canons of statutory construction, in-
cluding the principle that legislation using a widely accepted judicial term should not be con-
strued as changing the term's accepted meaning, unless Congress expressly states otherwise. See
Commissioner v Keystone Consolidated Industries Inc, 508 US 152, 158-59 (1993) (concluding
that because the "phrase 'sale or exchange' had acquired a settled judicial and administrative in-
terpretation over the course of a half century before when" Congress enacted particular legisla-
tion using those terms, Congress "presumptively was aware" of the language's meaning); Hardy
Salt Co v Sanders Brine Shrimp Co, 501 F2d 1156, 1168 (10th Cir 1974) ("When Congress uses
words in a statute without defining them, and those words have a judicially settled meaning, it is
presumed that Congress intended them to have that meaning within the statute."). In recent
years this doctrine has been invoked by Justice Stevens to contend that courts should be reluc-
tant "to give sweeping effect and broad literal application to statutory language where the lan-
guage operates to alter a status quo of long-standing consensus or would tend to make for an ab-
surd or bizarre result." Jeffery W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "Abso-
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Even if prior arrest records may be considered as part of a juve-
nile's prior delinquency record, the Seventh Circuit's conclusion "that
the government should not be allowed to hold mini-trials, attempting
to prove the underlying conduct in those instances where an arrest did
not result in a conviction""' needs refinement. The Seventh Circuit
never fully articulated its reason for prohibiting mini-trials other than
to suggest they would waste resources and to assert they are beyond
the scope of the FJDA."' Ostensibly, this holding suggests that the
government cannot engage in a fishing expedition to prove the juve-
nile's "bad character."
This conclusion, however, must not be interpreted to mean that
the juvenile may not challenge the probative value of a previous ar-
rest. An arrest, in and of itself does not prove a violation of the law."'
As the Supreme Court explained years ago, "[t]he mere fact that a
man has been arrested has very little, if any, probative value in show-
ing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing
more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended
of an offense."' The Seventh Circuit recently echoed this theme, not-
ing that an arrest record "'by itself' cannot be 'reliable information'
that defendant engaged in prior criminal conduct.'.'
The use of arrest records, more generally, raises reliability con-
cerns."2 As the Seventh Circuit previously held, when sentencing an
adult (who has been found guilty of a crime), "there is some question
whether ... [a court] could even consider juvenile conduct not leading
to conviction to be 'reliable information' due to the 'differential avail-
ability of records' in each state concerning juvenile arrests."'3
lute" Exclusions in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 Tort & Ins
L J 1, 36 n 151. In such circumstances, "the fact that the dog did not bark"-that Congress did
not specifically announce or indicate a change in policy-"can itself be significant" Griffin v
Oceanic Contractors, Inc, 458 US 564,589 (1982) (Stevens dissenting). See also Harrison v PPG
Industries, Inc, 446 US 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist dissenting) (recognizing the "dog did not
bark" approach as a legitimate means of statutory interpretation).
157 Wilson, 149 F3d at 613.
158 Id. Read in its entirety, the reason for this prohibition may stem from concerns over the
due process issues articulated in In re Sealed Case.The section of Wilson immediately proceeding
the prior record analysis dealt with a due process challenge. See id at 612-13.The court, however,
never made this link, and this Comment is reluctant to impute such a motive.
159 See United States v Gammon, 961 F2d 103,108 (7th Cir 1992) ("[Use of prior juvenile
arrests is also troubling because [the district court] relied solely on the information contained in
the presentence report, which merely stated, '[the defendant] had the following juvenile arrests
....' This information was not sufficient for the district court to rely on because it is analogous to
an arrest record.").
160 Schware v Board of Bar Examiners, 353 US 232,241 (1957).
161 Gammon, 961 F2d at 108, quoting United States v Terry, 930 F2d 542, 545-46 (7th Cir
1991).
162 See Snyder and Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders at 143 (cited in note 1) ("Half of the
prosecutor officers using juvenile history records criticized their lack of completeness.").
163 Gammon, 961 F2d at 108.
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More specifically, the use of arrest records without the opportu-
nity for challenge by the minor could disproportionately and inappro-
priately characterize minorities as youthful offenders. As one com-
mentator observed, "although African-American youth age ten to
seventeen constitute 15 percent of the U.S. population, they account
for 26 percent of juvenile arrests.' Recently, in fact, some have criti-
cized the willingness of police officers to "use race as a proxy for an
increased risk of criminality."1" As a result of this "proxy," some have
concluded African-American males are "vastly overrepresented" in
the criminal justice system.'As one commentator explained, possible
inequalities in the justice system "reach down to the first level of the
criminal justice process, the points at which police decide who they
will investigate, approach, stop, frisk, and ultimately arrest."'67 Given
both the questionable reliability of police records and the possible
disparate impact their use may have on minorities, it is only appropri-
ate that juveniles be given the opportunity to challenge the probative
value of such records during transfer hearings.
In addition, to deny a juvenile the right to challenge the validity
of such arrest records would seem to run afoul of the Supreme Court's
holding in Kent that material used in a transfer hearing be "susceptible
to challenge or impeachment."' If a juvenile is not allowed to ques-
tion the validity of a prior arrest, then the transferring court would be
able to assume the truth of the underlying conduct without the possi-
bility of later correction at trial. This is the very sort of faulty due
process rejected in In re Sealed Case.'Y While permitting the juvenile
164 See Finley and Schindler, 63 Fed Prob at 11 (cited in note 1). See also Snyder and Sick-
mund, Juvenile Offenders at 193 (cited in note 1) (noting "existing research suggests that
race/ethnicity does make a difference in juvenile justice decisions in some jurisdictions at least
some of the time"); Feld, 84 Minn L Rev at 362 (cited in note 1) (noting that "since the mid-
1960s, police have arrested black juveniles under eighteen years of age for all violent offenses ...
at a rate about five times greater than that of white youths").
165 Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 137 (Pantheon 1997). See also David A.
Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion.: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69
Ind L J 659,688 (1994) (concluding more stringent probable cause standards must be applied to
avoid the over-targeting of minorities for police stops in high crime areas);Tracey Maclin, "Black
and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should
Race Matter?, 26 Valp U L Rev 243,260 (1991) ("Black men are considered suspicious and tar-
geted for questioning not because of any objective or empirical evidence that they are engaged
in criminality, but because of police bias and societal indifference to the plight of black males
who are on the receiving-end of aggressive police tactics.").
166 Harris, 69 Ind L J at 679 (cited in note 165).
167 Id.
168 Kent, 383 US at 563. The Supreme Court made this statement in reference to staff re-
ports that normally would not be available for review by an attorney.
169 See In re Sealed Case, 893 F2d at 369 (noting how "[a]llegations of other uncharged acts.
will not be correct[ed] at trial" if brought in under the nature of the alleged offense prong);
LWO, 160 F3d at 1183 (agreeing that allegations of uncharged crime cannot be corrected at the
trial stage).
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to challenge the probative value of arrest records may result in the
"mini-trials" condemned by the Wilson court, the juvenile's due proc-
ess rights require such a holding.
Moreover, to deny the juvenile the right to challenge the validity
of the underlying facts of an arrest is at odds with the Seventh Cir-
cuit's holdings in analogous adult contexts. The court has suggested,
for instance, that unadjudicated juvenile arrests should only be used to
increase an adult sentence where the reports are reliable (such as
when a detailed police report is made) and where the defendant is
able to challenge the "underlying facts" of the arrest."' If an adult who
has already been tried and convicted of a crime may challenge the
probative value of a juvenile arrest during sentencing, it seems odd to
prohibit a juvenile from doing the same when he has yet to be even
tried let alone convicted.
Consequently, in light of precedent and the text of the FJDA,
evidence of prior arrests should be admitted under the prior delin-
quency record prong of the FJDA. However, that admission must be
with the express caveat that the juvenile should be able to challenge
the reliability and probative value of such arrests during the transfer
hearing.
B. Uncharged Criminal Conduct
Whether a court may examine uncharged criminal conduct171 is a
far more elusive question. For example, in LWO, the Eighth Circuit
not only considered allegedly criminal conduct on which a hearing
was pending (that is, a prior arrest), but it also allowed the district
court to consider an assault for which LWO had been neither charged
nor arrested (that is, uncharged conduct)."' That court, however, con-
cluded such conduct should not be seen as part of a juvenile's prior
record, but could be reviewed under other statutory factors. Thus, one
must consider whether such behavior should be reviewed under the
prior record factors, other Section 5032 factors, or not at all.
1. Part of a prior juvenile record.
No circuit has held explicitly that courts may consider criminal-
like conduct for which an individual has never been arrested or
170 See United States v Terry, 930 F2d 542,546 (7th Cir 1991) (contending that the defendant
could object to the underlying facts surrounding juvenile arrests during an adult sentencing
phase, but failed to do so).
171 Certainly, a person might be arrested but subsequently not charged for a crime. How-
ever, in this context, I use uncharged criminal conduct to mean alleged criminal conduct for
which a juvenile was never arrested.
172 LWO, 160 F3d at 1182-84.
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charged as part of a prior delinquency record."" Several district courts,
however, have considered uncharged and even non-criminal conduct
when looking at a juvenile's prior delinquency record. Such an inter-
pretation goes beyond the scope of traditional definitions of what is
commonly called a criminal record."' Indeed, if a court could examine
an array of uncharged-or unchargeable-conduct under the prior re-
cord factor, it effectively creates a "prior conduct" prong. Such an ap-
proach, it was recently noted, risks allowing judges to "mak[e]-up the
content of the [transfer] criteria ... and allows judges to skew a trans-
fer decision in the direction they personally favor.'7.. This type of
open-ended approach would invite the unfettered examinations Sec-
tion 5032 was designed to prevent. Consequently, since circuits ex-
pressly considering the meaning of prior delinquency record have not
permitted such an interpretation, and since such a reading appears to
be at odds with the test of Section 5032, it seems inappropriate for a
court to include under the prior record factor conduct for which a ju-
venile has never been charged or arrested."
2. The case for considering such conduct under other
statutory factors.
The Eighth Circuit's conclusion that prior conduct may not be
considered part of a juvenile's prior record but may be considered un-
der factors such as social background is not unpersuasive. The idea
that district courts should be able to examine a number of different
aspects surrounding a juvenile's life appeals to the old Progressive era
presumption that courts, looking carefully at each individual, can
make informed, appropriate decisions about each minor's fate."'
173 This is the point on which LWO and In re Sealed Case agree. See LWO, 160 F3d at 1183
("[T]he plain language of the term 'the juvenile's prior delinquency record' would not encom-
pass evidence of incidents or behavior, which could be of a delinquent or criminal nature."). Wil-
son, 149 F3d at 613, as discussed previously, extended this analysis to hold that prior arrests are
also included. See Part IV.C. See also In re Sealed Case, 893 F2d at 369 & n 12 (suggesting trans-
ferring courts may not consider uncharged conduct).
174 See, for example, United States v Dion L., 19 F Supp 2d 1224,1226 (D NM 1998) (includ-
ing school suspensions and expulsions "for using drugs and alcohol and for carrying a knife and
scissors as weapons" under the prior record factor); United States v M.H., 901 F Supp 1211, 1215
(E D Tex 1995) (including under the prior record factor, evidence that a juvenile offender may
have been involved in "two other uncharged robberies"); In re TW., 652 F Supp 1440,1444 (E D
Wis 1987) (considering disciplinary problems at school as part of a juvenile record).
175 See, for example, Camitsch v Risley, 705 F2d 351,354 (9th Cir 1983) (noting various defi-
nitions of prior records and case files). See also notes 153-63 and accompanying text.
176 Ullman, Note, 68 Fordham L Rev at 1361 (cited in note 153).
177 But compare this conclusion with id at 1363 (urging Congress to revise Section 5032 so
as to permit the consideration of "all prior police contacts").
178 See Section L.A (discussing the development of the Progressive idea).
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After all, some behavior that might be uncharged or unadjudi-
cated criminal conduct clearly reflects on the character and mindset of
a juvenile."' For instance, few people would likely contend that in a
case like Anthony Y, where the minor's uncharged and unadjudicated
conduct included destroying property, assaulting a counselor, and
abusing drugs, the juvenile's history of uncharged "criminal" conduct
should be ignored.' It is, one can argue, exactly this type of evidence
that juvenile courts are supposed to consider when deciding whether a
"juvenile has a realistic chance of rehabilitative potential.'...
Beyond intuitions and commonsensical arguments, a strong legal
argument exists for upholding the admission of "criminal-like con-
duct" under the social background, psychological maturity, or past
treatment factors.82 It is difficult to deny that those terms, especially
given the limited statutory guidance provided and the court's obliga-
tion to act in the interest of justice, invite broad interpretations. More-
over, it is, one could point out, important to keep in mind that evi-
dence presented under Section 5032's non-legal factors (for example,
social background and intellectual maturity) may be challenged by a
juvenile at his transfer hearing. Consequently, one could argue, as the
court in In re Sealed Case pointed out, that "if a juvenile [were] enti-
tled to rebut the uncharged offenses at the transfer hearing, due proc-
ess would not be an issue."" Thus, one could claim looking at un-
charged conduct is no different than considering prior arrests: as long
as the juvenile is able to challenge its probative value at a transfer
hearing, the evidence should be considered.
Finally, supporters of the LWO approach could claim that district
courts considering uncharged offenses must still draw a connection
between the alleged conduct and the Section 5032 factor under which
it is considered.' That is, a juvenile might still appeal and challenge
the consideration of past conduct where a court does not adequately
link the conduct to the factor. Nor, one could point out, are district
courts simply processing juveniles into the adult criminal justice sys-
tem without reflection or consideration. They carefully weigh the evi-
179 See, for example, Ulilman, Note, 68 Fordham L Rev at 1360-61 (cited in note 153) (argu-
ing that since the purpose of the "federal juvenile justite system is to rehabilitate juveniles ame-
nable to treatment," if a "juvenile shot a perfect stranger" but was never prosecuted for it, courts
should still be able to examine such conduct).
180 172 F3d at 1253.
181 United States v E.K., 471 F Supp 924,932 (D Or 1979).
182 18 USC § 5032.
183 In re Sealed Case, 893 F2d at 369 n 12.
184 See LWO, 160 F3d at 1183-84 (requiring a district court to explain "how the alleged in-
cidents, behavior, charges, and surrounding circumstances are relevant to that factor").
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dence presented, sort out irrelevant or minor past violations, and then
decide if a transfer is warranted.'
3. Considering uncharged conduct under other factors is
inappropriate.
While there are certainly good reasons to consider uncharged
criminal conduct, to construe Section 5032 as permitting the consid-
eration of "almost any action, criminal or otherwise, the juvenile has
taken"'  sweeps too broadly. First, such an interpretation runs rough-
shod over the other statutory factors delineated in the FJDA. If Con-
gress had intended the "social background" or "psychological devel-
opment" prongs to encompass a juvenile's uncharged prior criminal
conduct, why would it have found it necessary to draft an independent
"prior delinquency record" factor? Had Congress intended such broad
probing into almost every action ever committed by a juvenile, it
could have simply enacted a statute requiring transfer "if it is in the in-
terest of justice.'' "" It did not. To then read factors like "psychological
background" so broadly, effectively negates the significance and
meaning of the other transfer factors and violates the common canon
of statutory construction "that a statute should be construed in such a
way that no word, clause or sentence is rendered meaningless or su-
perfluous..'..
While it is one thing to suggest that a transferring court must
have broad discretion in deciding how to weigh factors for or against a
juvenile's transfer, it is entirely another to suggest that determining
what behavior falls under each factor is wholly discretionary. To read
factors such as social background and psychological maturity too
broadly ignores the fact that the 1974 FJDA amendments went be-
185 For cases bolstering this claim, see United States v Leon, D.M., 132 F3d 583 (10th Cir
1997) (upholding district court's refusal to transfer seventeen-year-old minor charged with mur-
der to adult status); United States v One Juvenile Male, 51 F Supp 2d 1094 (D Or 1999) (holding
that prospect of rehabilitation warranted refusing to transfer minor charged with shooting two
men and killing one); United States v Juvenile K.J.C, 976 F Supp 1219, 1228 (N D Iowa 1997)
(concluding that minor vandalism of property did not weigh in favor of transfer).
186 LWO, 160 F3d at 1183.
187 Such broad and unguided transfer statutes have survived constitutional challenges for
being too vague and broad. See, for example, Donald L. v Superior Court, 498 P2d 1098 (Cal
1972) (upholding statute that authorized transfer if court determined juvenile was not "fit" for
juvenile court system). See also State v Gorzelanny, 468 NE2d 589, 590 & n 4 (Ind App 1984)
(noting that once a court determines there is probable cause that a juvenile committed a certain
crime, and once the court determines the juvenile is over sixteen years of age, the only guidance
Indiana law (in 1984) gave to a trial court in transferring a juvenile was whether a juvenile adju-
dication was in the child's and community's "best interest").
188 Holloway v JC Penney Life Insurance Co, 190 F3d 838, 843 (7th Cir 1999). See also
Pennsylvania Medical Society v Snider, 29 F3d 886,895 (3d Cir 1994) ("A statute should be con-
strued so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superflu-
ous, void or insignificant.").
1458 [67:1431
2000] Interpreting "Prior Record" under the FJDA 1459
yond the holding of Kent and limited the type of areas a court could
consider when making a transfer decision.'o
Moreover, to look at any type of uncharged, allegedly delinquent
behavior sweeps in far too many cases. As one commentator observed,
"researchers have learned that arrest statistics merely reflect the tip of
the deviance iceberg ... Actual rates of illegal behavior soar so high
during adolescence that participation in delinquency appears to be a
normal part of teen life."' ' For unlike prior arrests, which at least have
some documentation and at least identify specific charges and, hope-
fully, the events surrounding them, prior "bad conduct" is so flexible a
concept that it invites the inclusion of almost any behavior without a
clearly identifiable limit. If such a reading could be applied to the Sec-
tion 5032 factors, then the due process protections the six statutory
factors were intended to provide juveniles.1 would be destroyed. As
one observer has noted, "The lack of uniformity in the federal ap-
proach to judicial waiver ... results in different dispositional outcomes
for similarly situated offenders.... and therefore may result in viola-
tions of due process. ' 9 Allowing the government to introduce previ-
ously uncharged conduct or undocumented police contacts, therefore,
could invite unmonitored roving that could consume substantial re-
sources"' and allow almost every type of infraction to be reviewed.
189 See S Rep No 93-1011 at 56 (cited in note 80) (noting Section 5032 was amended to pro-
vide "[s]pecific criteria ... by which the court shall assess the prospects for rehabilitation"). A
reading of the FJDA so that the factors it outlines are closely adhered to also seems to be in ac-
cordance with the statutory construction principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. See Na-
tional Railroad Passenger Corp v National Association of Railroad Passangers, 414 US 453, 458
(1974) ("A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly
provides a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute
to subsume other remedies."); Botany Worsted Mills v United States, 278 US 282, 289 (1929)
("When a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any
other mode."). Consequently, where the Congress has laid out the specific factors that a court
must consider when deciding to transfer a minor, it can be argued that only those factors should
be considered in making a transfer decision.
190 Terrie E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A
Developmental Taxonomy, 100 Psych Rev 674, 675 (1993). See also Snyder and Sickmund, Juve-
nile Offenders at 51 (cited in note 1) ("Many offenders are not arrested; and many arrested are
not referred to juvenile courts and, thus, are not captured in official law enforcement or court
data.").
191 See Part III.
192 Ullman, Note, 68 Fordham L Rev at 1357-58 (cited in note 153).
193 See Wilson, 149 F3d at 613 (warning against proceedings where the government at-
tempts to prove uncharged conduct through de facto trials that would "greatly burden the par-
ties").Admittedly, the Eighth Circuit did try to preempt such roaming by holding that the district
court "should articulate the reasons for considering such evidence, and the manner in which such
evidence bears upon the analysis of the factor." LWO, 160 F3d at 1184. Such a check, however,
would effectively allow a court to consider prior conduct so long as a reasonable explanation for
the factor exists. Given the amount of discretion the Eighth Circuit affords to such interpreta-
tions, it would be very hard for the juvenile to overcome such a finding.
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Thus, a court should not be permitted to consider uncharged
criminal conduct in making a transfer decision. Such an approach
keeps the six statutory factors within reasonable bounds, while still
permitting a court to make a largely discretionary transfer decision.
After all, the age of the minor, the cruelty of the underlying conduct,
prior record (narrowly defined), and psychological reviews all offer
courts ample information without lurching toward an unfettered in-
quiry into putative criminal conduct from the past. It must also be
kept in mind that individuals whom society might deem the most un-
worthy of a juvenile proceeding are automatically waived into crimi-
nal court.'95
CONCLUSION
Issues of juvenile adjudication are increasingly important to
courts at the federal level. As pressure grows to prosecute minors as
adults, it is important to resolve recent disagreements over the extent
to which a court may look at alleged prior criminal conduct. When de-
termining what constitutes a juvenile's "prior delinquency record,"
precedent and statutory construction of the FJDA suggest it is appro-
priate for courts to consider the minor's prior unadjudicated arrests.
However, the review of uncharged, allegedly criminal conduct is be-
yond the statutory factors outlined in the FJDA, and accordingly,
courts should not consider such conduct as part of a juvenile's "prior
record" or under any of the other FJDA factors.
194 For an example, see United States v Dion L., 19 F Supp 2d 1224,1226 (D NM 1998) (con-
sidering suspensions and expulsions from school for using drugs and alcohol as part of the juve-
nile's prior record).
195 See 18 USC § 5032 (providing that if a juvenile is previously found to have violated a
law and is alleged to have committed certain violent crimes or narcotic offenses, he is automati-
cally waived into criminal court).
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